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Positioning is a foreign concept to Chinese, and begins to gain popularity among China’s corporate and investment communities. In Al Ries and Jack Trout’s Positioning, they define it as ‘In communication jungle out there, the only hope to score big is to be selective, to concentrate on narrow targets, to practice segmentation’. Despite of its simple and easy-to-understand definition, its real life practices can go off track in so many ways or in the same way by so many players.， which happens not only among grass-roots domestic Chinese entrepreneurs, but also, more than too often, happens to the foreign connoisseurs and some of the most well-known foreign enterprises who define such a concept at the first place. Nowadays China, there are too many business concepts, models, international companies, growth and ‘success’ stories squeezing in such a short time that can constantly block people’s mind, rendering mind disoriented about even the most obvious market reality. Nothing could be more dangerous than losing sights on customers and the value to the customers. Some of foreign QSR chains are showing some very interesting positioning ideas but also betraying their shortcomings to read the market.
Before dig too deep into Jack Trout’s Positioning, there is Jack Trout’s The 22 Immutable Laws of Marketing: Violate Them at Your Own Risk. One business needs to have a market first or the demand for the market. Nothing can be more appalling than coffee market in China. It has no market at the first, and the giant international corporate built one from nowhere. Coffee is becoming synonymous to the modern culture in China right now. Despite of its grand publicity and culture undertone after over 20 years in China, the market is still small because its initial targeted consumers are never there, which renders its projected image and sales channels misleading. On the contrary, sweet and greasy milk tea never has a flashy look or strong publicity but is a right fit for Chinese taste. Milk tea gains huge popularity with only a fraction of the investment of coffee industry. Xiang PiaoPaio as the leading manufacture for packed milk tea built into a near one billion dollars business just in six years. In addition, there are hundreds of milk tea kiosk chains populating China, making good profits. When a service has a market or one can identify the fit market segment, positioning becomes the vehicle to beat the competition. Again, market has to be there first, and the service/product needs to be linked to the right consumer groups.
Hamburger fast food business is another example. McDonald came to China in 1993, and immediately gained popularity. In the past 20 years, it builds into the top three restaurant business in China and has most of its stores in the first and second tiers cities. If we simply follow the success of McDonald and the history of American fast food, and consider it’s a universal working business model, we may fall into the trap.
In America 60 years ago, many brands of hamburger fast food chains simultaneously gained popularity in 1950s, and some of them still go on strong till this day, such as McDonald, Burger King, Carl’s Jr., SONIC, Jack in the Box and many more.
Today in China, Burger King and Carl’s Jr. (in addition of several others with serious intention) already built some stores in China’s first and second tier cities with some well-established and respected local enterprise as their franchisees. However, one thousand McDonald stores in China means little to others to have the same growth potentials if one cannot identify its own market and the market segment. McDonald is the first one into the market at a time when Chinese still thought hamburger was exotic and good foods, and is also 13 years ahead of both Burger King and Carl’s Jr. McDonald did not franchise its business in China’s first and second tier cities, unlike what it does in the other part of the world. McDonald has a centralized management and operation and turn good profit in China. Even different from another more successful fast food chain, KFC, McDonald appears to have tendency to open at more middle-class concentrated residential/business area and in shopping mall for middle class.
On the other hand, the positioning strategy of Burger King and Carl’s Jr. is still hard to read because its targeted consumer group is not so clear. In the past several years, Burger King upgrades its store design to be quite fashionable and elegant and open at some more expensive and high end shopping malls and business complex. As already known, better educated white collars and more wealthy people are not particularly crazy for fast food no matter how a store is designed, and for its true core consumers may be more confused by the design than to appreciate it. In addition, both Burger King and Carl’s Jr have higher price than McDonald, which further undermines their competitive edge. Who are the customers is not yet to be answered. The strength of Burger King and Carl’s Jr is not to compete with McDonald heads-on, but focus on its products to the targeted customer group in a context to utilizing its strength in product development, marketing, management, technology to compete no matter if it is in first or fourth tier cities in China.
Another example is Donuts chain stores. Except Tim Hortons, all other major donuts brands have landed in China such as Mr. Donuts, Krispy Kreme and Dunkin Donuts. Mr. Donuts is quite popular in Japan when Dunkin Donuts has done well in South Korea. Somehow, it seems to be a safe bet. The truth is the contrary. Mr. Donuts is barely able to expand outside of Shanghai market when Dunkin Donuts cannot find its positioning touch either. Krispy Kreme still just has one store after years of planning in Shanghai. As bakery store, donuts store’s unitary product line cannot match with the flourish bakery’ stores hugely popular in China’s cities; as a coffee shop, its ambiguous design cannot compete with Starbucks, Costa Coffee and even some local stores; as its price, it is too high for ordinary Chinese but too inappropriate for people who can afford coffee and donuts. Donuts stores, the same as many other foreign QSR investment in China, goes after most obvious market segment. The most obvious may just be the most misleading as well. When one visits a donut store, one may see a scene like this: a couple of grandparents take a grandson buying one donut for the kid. When ask why they don’t want to try a donut themselves, they would explain they don’t like it too sweet. It is a sad scene for a business which, because of its wrong positioning on the wrong market segment, can lead to this unfortunate branding result and also drag the product into a lousy reputation.
The international corporate has much more upper hand in its product development, marketing and management knowledge, and the capacity to build a supply chain to achieve its targeted price in order to penetrate right market segment. Unfortunate, some of the international corporate are hardly able to get down to the grass-roots level of China’s consumer market (a 1.3 billion people market), and may have to continue to struggle. Both hamburger and donuts can sell well and sell a lot of better in China. The question is: who are your customers?
Before dig too deep into Jack Trout’s Positioning, there is Jack Trout’s The 22 Immutable Laws of Marketing: Violate Them at Your Own Risk. One business needs to have a market first or the demand for the market. Nothing can be more appalling than coffee market in China. It has no market at the first, and the giant international corporate built one from nowhere. Coffee is becoming synonymous to the modern culture in China right now. Despite of its grand publicity and culture undertone after over 20 years in China, the market is still small because its initial targeted consumers are never there, which renders its projected image and sales channels misleading. On the contrary, sweet and greasy milk tea never has a flashy look or strong publicity but is a right fit for Chinese taste. Milk tea gains huge popularity with only a fraction of the investment of coffee industry. Xiang PiaoPaio as the leading manufacture for packed milk tea built into a near one billion dollars business just in six years. In addition, there are hundreds of milk tea kiosk chains populating China, making good profits. When a service has a market or one can identify the fit market segment, positioning becomes the vehicle to beat the competition. Again, market has to be there first, and the service/product needs to be linked to the right consumer groups.
Hamburger fast food business is another example. McDonald came to China in 1993, and immediately gained popularity. In the past 20 years, it builds into the top three restaurant business in China and has most of its stores in the first and second tiers cities. If we simply follow the success of McDonald and the history of American fast food, and consider it’s a universal working business model, we may fall into the trap.
In America 60 years ago, many brands of hamburger fast food chains simultaneously gained popularity in 1950s, and some of them still go on strong till this day, such as McDonald, Burger King, Carl’s Jr., SONIC, Jack in the Box and many more.
Today in China, Burger King and Carl’s Jr. (in addition of several others with serious intention) already built some stores in China’s first and second tier cities with some well-established and respected local enterprise as their franchisees. However, one thousand McDonald stores in China means little to others to have the same growth potentials if one cannot identify its own market and the market segment. McDonald is the first one into the market at a time when Chinese still thought hamburger was exotic and good foods, and is also 13 years ahead of both Burger King and Carl’s Jr. McDonald did not franchise its business in China’s first and second tier cities, unlike what it does in the other part of the world. McDonald has a centralized management and operation and turn good profit in China. Even different from another more successful fast food chain, KFC, McDonald appears to have tendency to open at more middle-class concentrated residential/business area and in shopping mall for middle class.
On the other hand, the positioning strategy of Burger King and Carl’s Jr. is still hard to read because its targeted consumer group is not so clear. In the past several years, Burger King upgrades its store design to be quite fashionable and elegant and open at some more expensive and high end shopping malls and business complex. As already known, better educated white collars and more wealthy people are not particularly crazy for fast food no matter how a store is designed, and for its true core consumers may be more confused by the design than to appreciate it. In addition, both Burger King and Carl’s Jr have higher price than McDonald, which further undermines their competitive edge. Who are the customers is not yet to be answered. The strength of Burger King and Carl’s Jr is not to compete with McDonald heads-on, but focus on its products to the targeted customer group in a context to utilizing its strength in product development, marketing, management, technology to compete no matter if it is in first or fourth tier cities in China.
Another example is Donuts chain stores. Except Tim Hortons, all other major donuts brands have landed in China such as Mr. Donuts, Krispy Kreme and Dunkin Donuts. Mr. Donuts is quite popular in Japan when Dunkin Donuts has done well in South Korea. Somehow, it seems to be a safe bet. The truth is the contrary. Mr. Donuts is barely able to expand outside of Shanghai market when Dunkin Donuts cannot find its positioning touch either. Krispy Kreme still just has one store after years of planning in Shanghai. As bakery store, donuts store’s unitary product line cannot match with the flourish bakery’ stores hugely popular in China’s cities; as a coffee shop, its ambiguous design cannot compete with Starbucks, Costa Coffee and even some local stores; as its price, it is too high for ordinary Chinese but too inappropriate for people who can afford coffee and donuts. Donuts stores, the same as many other foreign QSR investment in China, goes after most obvious market segment. The most obvious may just be the most misleading as well. When one visits a donut store, one may see a scene like this: a couple of grandparents take a grandson buying one donut for the kid. When ask why they don’t want to try a donut themselves, they would explain they don’t like it too sweet. It is a sad scene for a business which, because of its wrong positioning on the wrong market segment, can lead to this unfortunate branding result and also drag the product into a lousy reputation.
The international corporate has much more upper hand in its product development, marketing and management knowledge, and the capacity to build a supply chain to achieve its targeted price in order to penetrate right market segment. Unfortunate, some of the international corporate are hardly able to get down to the grass-roots level of China’s consumer market (a 1.3 billion people market), and may have to continue to struggle. Both hamburger and donuts can sell well and sell a lot of better in China. The question is: who are your customers?
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